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Abstract We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each
voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-
size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which
we call justified representation (JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group
of voters exhibits agreement by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter
in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee. We show that for
every list of ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides JR. However,
it turns out that several prominent approval-based voting rules may fail to output
such a committee. In particular, while Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) always
outputs a committee that provides JR, Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV), a tractable
approximation to PAV, does not have this property. We then introduce a stronger
version of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified representation (EJR), and
show that PAV satisfies EJR, while other rules we consider do not; indeed, EJR can
be used to characterize PAV within the class of weighted PAV rules. We also consider
several other questions related to JR and EJR, including the relationship between
JR/EJR and core stability, and the complexity of the associated algorithmic problems.
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1 Introduction
The aggregation of preferences is a central problem in the field of social choice.
While the most-studied scenario is that of selecting a single candidate out of many, it
is often the case that one needs to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee): this
includes domains such as parliamentary elections, the hiring of faculty members, or
(automated) agents deciding on a set of plans (LeGrand et al. 2007; Davis et al. 2014;
Elkind et al. 2014, 2015; Skowron et al. 2015a). The study of algorithmic complexity
of voting rules that output committees is an active research direction (Procaccia et al.
2008; Meir et al. 2008; Caragiannis et al. 2010; Lu and Boutilier 2011; Cornaz et al.
2012; Betzler et al. 2013; Skowron et al. 2015b,c).
In this paper we consider approval-based rules, where each voter lists the subset
of candidates that she approves of. There is a growing literature on voting rules that
are based on approval ballots: the Handbook on Approval Voting (Laslier and Sanver
2010) provides a very useful survey of pre-2010 research on this topic, and after this
seminal book was published, various aspects of approval voting continued to attract
a considerable amount of attention (see, e.g., the papers of Caragiannis et al. 2010;
Endriss 2013; Duddy 2014). One of the advantages of approval ballots is their sim-
plicity: such ballots reduce the cognitive burden on voters (rather than providing a full
ranking of the candidates, a voter only needs to decide which candidates to approve)
and are also easier to communicate to the election authority. The most straightforward
way to aggregate approvals is to have every approval for a candidate contribute one
point to that candidate’s score and select the candidates with the highest score. This
rule is called Approval Voting (AV). AV has many desirable properties in the single-
winner case (Brams et al. 2006; Endriss 2013), including its “simplicity, propensity
to elect Condorcet winners (when they exist), its robustness to manipulation and its
monotonicity” (Brams 2010, p. viii). However, for the case of multiple winners, the
merits of AV are “less clear” (Brams 2010, p. viii). For example, AV may fail pro-
portional representation: if the goal is to select k winners, k > 1, 51% of the voters
approve the same k candidates, and the remaining voters approve a disjoint set of k
candidates, then the voters in minority do not get any of their approved candidates
selected.
As a consequence, over the years, several multi-winner rules based on approval
ballots have been proposed (see, e.g., the survey by Kilgour 2010); we will now
briefly describe the rules that will be considered in this paper (see Section 2 for for-
mal definitions). Under Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), each voter’s contribu-
tion to the committee’s total score depends on how many candidates from the voter’s
approval set have been elected. In the canonical variant of this rule the marginal util-
ity of the ℓ-th approved candidate is 1
ℓ
, i.e. this rule is associated with the weight
vector (1, 12 , 13 , . . . ); other weight vectors can be used as well, resulting in the family
of weighted PAV rules. A sequential variant of PAV is known as Reweighted Ap-
proval Voting (RAV); again, by varying the weight vector, we obtain the family of
weighted RAV rules. Another way to modulate the approvals is through computing a
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satisfaction score for each voter based on the ratio of the number of their approved
candidates appearing in the committee and their total number of approved candi-
dates; this idea leads to Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV). One could also use a
distance-based approach: Minimax Approval Voting (MAV) selects a set of k candi-
dates that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance from the submitted ballots.
Finally, one could adapt classic rules that provide fully proportional representation,
such as the Chamberlin–Courant rule (Chamberlin and Courant 1983) or the Monroe
rule (Monroe 1995), to work with approval ballots, by using each voter’s ballot as
a scoring vector. All the rules informally described above have a more egalitarian
objective than AV . For example, Steven Brams, a proponent of AV in single-winner
elections, has argued that SAV is more suitable for equitable representation in multi-
winner elections (Brams and Kilgour 2014).
The relative merits of approval-based multi-winner rules and the complexity
of winner determination under these rules have been examined in great detail in
both economics and computer science in recent years (Brams and Fishburn 2007;
LeGrand et al. 2007; Meir et al. 2008; Caragiannis et al. 2010; Aziz et al. 2015;
Byrka and Sornat 2014; Misra et al. 2015). On the other hand, there has been lim-
ited axiomatic analysis of these rules from the perspective of representation (see,
however, Section 7).
In this paper, we introduce the notion of justified representation (JR) in approval-
based voting. Briefly, a committee is said to provide justified representation for a
given set of ballots if every large enough group of voters with shared preferences
is allocated at least one representative. A rule is said to satisfy justified representa-
tion if it always outputs a committee that provides justified representation. This con-
cept is related to the Droop proportionality criterion (Droop 1881) and Dummett’s
solid coalition property (Dummett 1984; Tideman and Richardson 2000; Elkind et al.
2014), but is specific to approval-based elections.
We show that every set of ballots admits a committee that provides justified rep-
resentation; moreover, such a committee can be computed efficiently, and checking
whether a given committee provides JR can be done in polynomial time as well. This
shows that justified representation is a reasonable requirement. However, it turns out
that many popular multi-winner approval-based rules fail JR; in particular, this is the
case for AV , SAV , MAV and the canonical variant of RAV. On the positive side, JR is
satisfied by some of the weighted PAV rules, including the canonical PAV rule, as well
as by the weighted RAV rule associated with the weight vector (1, 0, . . . ) and by the
Monroe rule. Also, MAV satisfies JR for a restricted domain of voters’ preferences.
We then consider a strengthening of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified
representation (EJR). This axiom captures the intuition that a very large group of
voters with similar preferences may deserve not just one, but several representatives.
EJR turns out to be a more demanding property than JR: of all voting rules considered
in this paper, only the canonical PAV rule satisfies EJR. Thus, in particular, EJR char-
acterizes the canonical PAV rule within the class of weighted PAV rules. However,
we show that it is computationally hard to check whether a given committee provides
EJR.
We also consider other strengthenings of JR, which we call semi-strong justified
representation and strong justified representation; however, it turns out that for some
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inputs the requirements imposed by these axioms are impossible to satisfy. Finally,
we explore the relationship between JR/EJR and core stability in a non-transferable
utility game that can be associated with a multiwinner approval voting scenario. We
show that, even though EJR may appear to be similar to core stability, it is, in fact,
a strictly weaker condition. Indeed, the core stability condition appears to be too de-
manding, as none of the voting rules considered in our work is guaranteed to produce
a core stable outcome, even when the core is known to be non-empty. We conclude
the paper by showing how JR can be used to formulate other attractive approval-
based multi-winner rules, discussing related work, and identifying several directions
for future work.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a social choice setting with a set N = {1, . . . , n} of voters and a set C
of candidates. Each voter i ∈ N submits an approval ballot Ai ⊆ C, which represents
the subset of candidates that she approves of. We refer to the list A = (A1, . . . , An) of
approval ballots as the ballot profile. We will consider approval-based multi-winner
voting rules that take as input a tuple (N,C,A, k), where k is a positive integer that
satisfies k ≤ |C|, and return a subset W ⊆ C of size k, which we call the winning set,
or committee (Kilgour and Marshall 2012). We omit N and C from the notation when
they are clear from the context. Several approval-based multi-winner rules are defined
below. Whenever the description of the rule does not uniquely specify a winning set,
we assume that ties are broken according to some deterministic procedure; however,
most of our results do not depend on the tie-breaking rule.
2.1 Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules
Approval Voting (AV) Under AV , the winners are the k candidates that receive the
largest number of approvals. Formally, the approval score of a candidate c ∈ C is
defined as |{i | c ∈ Ai}|, and AV outputs a set W of size k that maximizes
∑
c∈W |{i |
c ∈ Ai}|. AV has been adopted by several academic and professional societies such
as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).
Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) A voter’s satisfaction score is the fraction of
her approved candidates that are elected. SAV maximizes the sum of voters’ satisfac-
tion scores. Formally, SAV outputs a set W ⊆ C of size k that maximizes ∑i∈N |W∩Ai ||Ai| .
This rule was proposed with the aim of “representing more diverse interests” than AV
(Brams and Kilgour 2014).
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) Under PAV , a voter is assumed to derive
a utility of 1 + 12 +
1
3 + · · · +
1
j from a committee that contains exactly j of her
approved candidates, and the goal is to maximize the sum of the voters’ utilities.
Formally, the PAV-score of a set W ⊆ C is defined as ∑i∈N r(|W ∩ Ai|), where r(p) =∑p
j=1
1
j , and PAV outputs a set W ⊆ C of size k with the highest PAV-score. Though
sometimes attributed to Forest Simmons, PAV was already proposed by the Danish
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polymath Thorvald N. Thiele in the 19th century (Thiele 1895).1 PAV captures the
idea of diminishing returns: an individual voter’s preferences should count less the
more she is satisfied.
We can generalize the definition of PAV by using an arbitrary score vector in place
of (1, 12 , 13 , . . . ). Specifically, for every vector2 w = (w1,w2, . . . ), where w1,w2, . . . are
non-negative reals, we define a voting rule w-PAV that operates as follows. Given a
ballot profile (A1, . . . , An) and a target number of winners k, w-PAV returns a set W
of size k with the highest w-PAV score, defined by ∑i∈N rw(|W ∩ Ai|), where rw(p) =∑p
j=1 w j. Usually, it is required that w1 = 1 and w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . . The latter constraint is
appropriate in the context of representative democracy: it is motivated by the intuition
that once an agent already has one or more representatives in the committee, that
agent should have less priority for further representation. It what follows, we will
always impose the constraint w1 = 1 (as we can always rescale the weight vector, this
is equivalent to requiring that w1 > 0; while the case w1 = 0 may be of interest in
some applications, we omit it in order to keep the length of the paper manageable3)
and explicitly indicate which of our results require that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ; in particular,
for our characterization of PAV in Theorem 11 this is not the case.
Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV) RAV converts PAV into a multi-round rule, by
selecting a candidate in each round and then reweighing the approvals for the subse-
quent rounds. Specifically, RAV starts by setting W = ∅. Then in round j, j = 1, . . . , k,
it computes the approval weight of each candidate c as ∑i:c∈Ai 11+|W∩Ai | , selects a
candidate with the highest approval weight, and adds him to W. After k rounds, it
outputs the set W. RAV has also been referred to as “sequential proportional AV”
(Brams and Kilgour 2014), and was used briefly in Sweden during the early 1900s.
Thiele (1895) proposed RAV as a tractable approximation to PAV (see Section 2.2
for a discussion of the computational complexity of these rules and the relation-
ship between them). We note that there are several other examples of voting rules
that were conceived as approximate versions of other rules, yet became viewed as
legitimate voting rules in and of themselves; two representative examples are the
Simplified Dodgson rule of Tideman (2006), which was designed as an approxi-
mate version of the Dodgson rule (see the discussion by Caragiannis et al. 2014), and
the Greedy Monroe rule of Skowron et al. (2015b), which approximates the Monroe
rule (Monroe 1995).
Just as for PAV, we can extend the definition of RAV to score vectors other than
(1, 12 , 13 , . . . ): every vector w = (w1,w2, . . . ) defines a sequential voting rule w-RAV,
which proceeds as RAV , except that it computes the approval weight of a candidate c
in round j as ∑i:c∈Ai w|W∩Ai |+1, where W is the winning set after the first j − 1 rounds.
Again, we impose the constraint w1 = 1 (note that if w1 = 0, then w-RAV can pick an
arbitrary candidate at the first step, which is obviously undesirable).
1 We are grateful to Xavier Mora and Svante Janson for pointing this out to us.
2 It is convenient to think of w as an infinite vector; note that for an election with m candidates only the
first m entries of w matter. To analyze the complexity of w-PAV rules, one would have to place additional
requirements on w; however, we do not consider algorithmic properties of such rules in this paper.
3 Generalizations of PAV with w1 = 0 have been considered by Fishburn and Pekec (2004) and
Skowron et al. (2015d). We note that such rules do not satisfy justified representation (as defined in Sec-
tion 3).
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A particularly interesting rule in this class is (1, 0, . . . )-RAV: this rule, which
we will refer to as Greedy Approval Voting (GAV), can be seen as a variant of the
SweetSpotGreedy (SSG) algorithm of Lu and Boutilier (2011), and admits a very
simple description: we pick candidates one by one, trying to ‘cover’ as many cur-
rently ‘uncovered’ voters as possible. In more detail, a winning committee under this
rule can be computed by the following algorithm. We start by setting C′ = C, A′ = A,
and W = ∅. As long as |W | < k and A′ is non-empty, we pick a candidate c ∈ C′ that
has the highest approval score with respect to A′, and set W := W ∪{c}, C′ := C′ \{c}.
Also, we remove from A′ all ballots Ai such that c ∈ Ai. If at some point we have
|W | < k and A′ is empty, we add an arbitrary set of k − |W | candidates from C′ to W
and return W; if this does not happen, we terminate after having picked k candidates.
We will also consider a variant of GAV , where, at each step, after selecting a
candidate c, instead of removing all voters in Ac = {i | c ∈ Ai} from A′, we remove
a subset of Ac of size min
{
⌈ nk ⌉, |Ac|
}
. This rule can be seen as an adaptation of the
classic STV rule to approval ballots, and we will refer to it as GAVT (where T stands
for ‘threshold’).4
Minimax Approval Voting (MAV) MAV returns a committee W that minimizes
the maximum Hamming distance between W and the voters’ ballots; this rule was
proposed by Brams et al. (2007). Formally, let d(Q, T ) = |Q \ T | + |T \ Q| and define
the MAV-score of a set W ⊆ C as max (d(W, A1), . . . , d(W, An)). MAV outputs a size-k
set with the lowest MAV-score.
Chamberlin–Courant and Monroe Approval Voting (CCAV and MonAV) The
Chamberlin–Courant rule (Chamberlin and Courant 1983) is usually defined for the
setting where each voter provides a full ranking of the candidates. Each voter i ∈ N
is associated with a scoring vector ui = (ui1, . . . , uim) whose entries are non-negative
reals; we think of uij as voter i’s satisfaction from being represented by candidate c j. A
voter’s satisfaction from a committee W is defined as maxc j∈W uij, and the rule returns
a committee of size k that maximizes the sum of voters’ satisfactions. For the case of
approval ballots, it is natural to define the scoring vectors by setting uij = 1 if c j ∈ Ai
and uij = 0 otherwise; that is, a voter is satisfied by a committee if this committee
contains one of her approved candidates. Thus, the resulting rule is equivalent to
(1, 0, . . . )-PAV (and therefore we will not discuss it separately).
The Monroe rule (Monroe 1995) is a modification of the Chamberlin–Courant
rule where each committee member represents roughly the same number of vot-
ers. Just as under the Chamberlin–Courant rule, we have a scoring vector ui =
(ui1, . . . , uim) for each voter i ∈ N. Given a committee W of size k, we say that a
mapping π : N → W is valid if it satisfies |π−1(c)| ∈
{
⌊ nk ⌋, ⌈
n
k ⌉
}
for each c ∈ W.
The Monroe score of a valid mapping π is given by ∑i∈N uiπ(i), and the Monroe score
of a committee W is the maximum Monroe score of a valid mapping from N to
W. The Monroe rule returns a size-k committee with the maximum Monroe score.
For approval ballots, we define the scoring vectors in the same manner as for the
4 For readability, we use the Hare quota ⌈ nk ⌉; however, all our proofs go through if we use the Droop
quota ⌈ nk+1 ⌉+1 instead. For a discussion of differences between these two quotas, see the article of Tideman(1995).
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Chamberlin–Courant Approval Voting rule; we call the resulting rule the Monroe
Approval Voting rule (MonAV).
We note that for k = 1, AV , PAV , RAV , GAV , GAVT and MonAV produce the same
output if there is a unique candidate with the highest approval score. However, such
a candidate need not be a winner under SAV or MAV .
2.2 Computational Complexity
The rules listed above differ from an algorithmic perspective. For some of these
rules, namely, AV , SAV , RAV , GAV and GAVT , a winning committee can be com-
puted in polynomial time; this is also true for w-RAV as long the entries of the
weight vector are rational numbers that can be efficiently computed given the num-
ber of candidates. In contrast, PAV, MAV , and MonAV are computationally hard
(Aziz et al. 2015; Skowron et al. 2015a; LeGrand et al. 2007; Procaccia et al. 2008);
for w-PAV, the hardness result holds for most weight vectors, including (1, 0, . . . ),
(i.e., it holds for CCAV). However, both PAV and MAV admit efficient approxima-
tion algorithms (i.e., algorithms that output committees which are approximately
optimal with respect to the optimization criteria of these rules) and have been an-
alyzed from the perspective of parameterized complexity. Specifically, w-PAV admits
an efficient
(
1 − 1
e
)
-approximation algorithm as long as the weight vector w is ef-
ficiently computable and non-increasing; in fact, such an algorithm is provided by
w-RAV (Skowron et al. 2015a). For MAV , LeGrand et al. (2007) propose a simple 3-
approximation algorithm; Caragiannis et al. (2010) improve the approximation ratio
to 2 and Byrka and Sornat (2014) develop a polynomial-time approximation scheme.
Misra et al. (2015) show that MAV is fixed-parameter tractable for a number of natu-
ral parameters; Elkind and Lackner (2015) obtain fixed parameter tractability results
for PAV when voters’ preferences are, in some sense, single-dimensional. There is
also a number of tractability results for CCAV , and, to a lesser extent, for MonAV; we
refer the reader to the work of Skowron et al. (2015a) and references therein.
3 Justified Representation
We will now define one of the main concepts of this paper.
Definition 1 (Justified representation (JR)) Given a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An)
over a candidate set C and a target committee size k, we say that a set of candidates
W of size |W | = k provides justified representation for (A, k) if there does not exist
a set of voters N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| ≥ nk such that
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai , ∅ and Ai ∩ W = ∅ for
all i ∈ N∗. We say that an approval-based voting rule satisfies justified representation
(JR) if for every profile A = (A1, . . . , An) and every target committee size k it outputs
a winning set that provides justified representation for (A, k).
The logic behind this definition is that if k candidates are to be selected, then, intu-
itively, each group of nk voters “deserves” a representative. Therefore, a set of
n
k voters
that have at least one candidate in common should not be completely unrepresented.
We refer the reader to Section 6 for a discussion of alternative definitions.
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3.1 Existence and Computational Properties
We start our analysis of justified representation by observing that, for every ballot
profile A and every value of k, there is a committee that provides justified represen-
tation for (A, k), and, moreover, such a committee can be computed efficiently given
the voters’ ballots. In fact, both GAV and GAVT output a committee that provides JR.
Theorem 1 GAV and GAVT satisfy JR.
Proof We present a proof that applies to both GAV and GAVT . Suppose for the sake
of contradiction that for some ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) and some k > 0, GAV
(respectively, GAVT ) outputs a committee that does not provide justified representa-
tion for (A, k). Then there exists a set N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| ≥ nk such that
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai , ∅
and, when GAV (respectively, GAVT ) terminates, every ballot Ai such that i ∈ N∗ is
still in A′. Consider some candidate c ∈ ⋂i∈N∗ Ai. At every point in the execution of
our algorithm, c’s approval score is at least |N∗| ≥ nk . As c was not elected, at every
stage the algorithm selected a candidate whose approval score was at least as high as
that of c. Thus, at the end of each stage the algorithm removed from A′ at least ⌈ nk ⌉
ballots containing the candidate added to W at that stage, so altogether the algorithm
has removed at least k · nk ballots from A
′
. This contradicts the assumption that A′
contains at least nk ballots when the algorithm terminates. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1 shows that it is easy to find a committee that provides justified repre-
sentation for a given ballot profile. It is also not too hard to check whether a given
committee W provides JR. Indeed, while it may seem that we need to consider every
subset of voters of size nk , in fact it is sufficient to consider the candidates one by one,
and, for each candidate c, compute s(c) = |{i ∈ N | c ∈ Ai, Ai ∩ W = ∅}|; the set W
fails to provide justified representation for (A, k) if and only if there exists a candidate
c with s(c) ≥ nk . We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2 There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a ballot profile A
over a candidate set C, and a committee W, |W | = k, decides whether W provides
justified representation for (A, k).
3.2 Justified Representation and Unanimity
A desirable property of single-winner approval-based voting rules is unanimity: a
voting rule is unanimous if, given a ballot profile (A1, . . . , An) with ∩i∈N Ai , ∅, it
outputs a candidate in ∩i∈N Ai. This property is somewhat similar in spirit to JR, so
the reader may expect that for k = 1 it is equivalent to JR. However, it turns out that
the JR axiom is strictly weaker than unanimity for k = 1: while unanimity implies
JR, the converse is not true, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1 Let N = {1, . . . , n}, C = {a, b1, . . . , bn}, Ai = {a, bi} for i ∈ N. Consider
a voting rule that for k = 1 outputs b1 on this profile and coincides with GAV in
all other cases. Clearly, this rule is not unanimous; however, it satisfies JR, as it is
impossible to find a group of nk = n unrepresented voters for (A1, . . . , An).
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It is not immediately clear how to define unanimity for multi-winner voting rules;
however, any reasonable definition would be equivalent to the standard definition of
unanimity when k = 1, and therefore would be different from justified representation.
We remark that a rule can be unanimous for k = 1 and provide JR for all values
of k: this is the case, for instance, for GAV .
4 Justified Representation under Approval-Based Rules
We have argued that justified representation is a reasonable condition: there always
exists a committee that provides it, and, moreover, such a committee can be computed
efficiently. It is therefore natural to ask whether prominent voting rules satisfy JR. In
this section, we will answer this question for AV , SAV, MAV , PAV, RAV , and MonAV.
We will also identify conditions on w that are sufficient/necessary for w-PAV and
w-RAV to satisfy JR.
In what follows, for each rule we will try to identify the range of values of k for
which this rule satisfies JR. Trivially, all rules that we consider satisfy JR for k = 1.
It turns out that AV fails JR for k > 2, and for k = 2 the answer depends on the
tie-breaking rule.
Theorem 3 For k = 2, AV satisfies JR if ties are broken in favor of sets that provide
JR. For k ≥ 3, AV fails JR.
Proof Suppose first that k = 2. Fix a ballot profile A. If every candidate is approved
by fewer than n2 voters in A, JR is trivially satisfied. If some candidate is approved
by more than n2 voters in A, then AV selects some such candidate, in which case no
group of ⌈ n2 ⌉ voters is unrepresented, so JR is satisfied in this case as well. It remains
to consider the case where n = 2n′, some candidates are approved by n′ voters, and
no candidate is approved by more than n′ voters. Then AV necessarily picks at least
one candidate approved by n′ voters; denote this candidate by c. In this situation
JR can only be violated if the n′ voters who do not approve c all approve the same
candidate (say, c′), and this candidate is not elected. But the approval score of c′ is
n′, and, by our assumption, the approval score of every candidate is at most n′, so
this is a contradiction with our tie-breaking rule. This argument also illustrates why
the assumption on the tie-breaking rule is necessary: it can be the case that n′ voters
approve c and c′′, and the remaining n′ voters approve c′, in which case the approval
score of {c, c′′} is the same as that of {c, c′}.
For k ≥ 3, we let C = {c0, c1, . . . , ck}, n = k, and consider the profile where the
first voter approves c0, whereas each of the remaining voters approves all of c1, . . . , ck.
JR requires c0 to be selected, but AV selects {c1, . . . , ck}. ⊓⊔
On the other hand, SAV and MAV fail JR even for k = 2.
Theorem 4 SAV and MAV do not satisfy JR for k ≥ 2.
Proof We first consider SAV. Fix k ≥ 2, let X = {x1, . . . , xk, xk+1}, Y = {y1, . . . , yk},
C = X ∪ Y, and consider the profile (A1, . . . , Ak), where A1 = X, A2 = {y1, y2},
Ai = {yi} for i = 3, . . . , k. JR requires each voter to be represented, but SAV will
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choose Y: the SAV-score of Y is k − 1, whereas the SAV-score of every committee W
with W ∩ X , ∅ is at most k − 2 + 12 +
1
k+1 < k − 1. Therefore, the first voter will
remain unrepresented.
For MAV , we use the following construction. Fix k ≥ 2, let X = {x1, . . . , xk},
Y = {y1, . . . , yk}, C = X ∪ Y ∪ {z}, and consider the profile (A1, . . . , A2k), where
Ai = {xi, yi} for i = 1, . . . , k, Ai = {z} for i = k + 1, . . . , 2k. Every committee of size
k that provides JR for this profile contains z. However, MAV fails to select z. Indeed,
the MAV-score of X is k + 1: we have d(X, Ai) = k for i ≤ k and d(X, Ai) = k + 1 for
i > k. Now, consider some committee W with |W | = k, z ∈ W. We have Ai∩W = ∅ for
some i ≤ k, so d(W, Ai) = k + 2. Thus, MAV prefers X to any committee that includes
z. ⊓⊔
The constructions used in the proof of Theorem 4 show that MAV and SAV may be-
have very differently: SAV appears to favor voters who approve very few candidates,
whereas MAV appears to favor voters who approve many candidates.
Interestingly, we can show that MAV satisfies JR if we assume that each voter
approves exactly k candidates and ties are broken in favor of sets that provide JR.
Theorem 5 If the target committee size is k, |Ai| = k for all i ∈ N, and ties are broken
in favor of sets that provide JR, then MAV satisfies JR.
Proof Consider a profile A = (A1, . . . , An) with |Ai| = k for all i ∈ N.
Observe that if there exists a set of candidates W with |W | = k such that W∩Ai , ∅
for all i ∈ N, then MAV will necessarily select some such set. Indeed, for any such set
W we have d(W, Ai) ≤ 2k − 1 for each i ∈ N, whereas if W′ ∩ Ai = ∅ for some set W′
with |W′| = k and some i ∈ N, then d(W′, Ai) = 2k. Further, by definition, every set
W such that |W | = k and W ∩ Ai , ∅ for all i ∈ N provides justified representation for
(A, k).
On the other hand, if there is no k-element set of candidates that intersects each
Ai, i ∈ N, then the MAV-score of every set of size k is 2k, and therefore MAV can pick
an arbitrary size-k subset. Since we assumed that the tie-breaking rule favors sets that
provide JR, our claim follows. ⊓⊔
While Theorem 5 provides an example of a setting where MAV satisfies JR, this
result is not entirely satisfactory: first, we had to place a strong restriction on voters’
preferences, and, second, we used a tie-breaking rule that was tailored to JR.
We will now show that PAV satisfies JR, for all ballot profiles and irrespective of
the tie-breaking rule.
Theorem 6 PAV satisfies JR.
Proof Fix a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) and a k > 0 and let s = ⌈ nk ⌉. Let W be
the output of PAV on (A, k). Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a
set N∗ ⊂ N, |N∗| ≥ s, such that
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai , ∅, but W ∩
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai = ∅. Let c be some
candidate approved by all voters in N∗.
For each candidate w ∈ W, define its marginal contribution as the difference
between the PAV-score of W and that of W\{w}. Let m(W) denote the sum of marginal
contributions of all candidates in W. Observe that if c were to be added to the winning
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set, this would increase the PAV-score by at least s. Therefore, it suffices to argue that
the marginal contribution of some candidate in W is less than s: this would mean that
swapping this candidate with c increases the PAV-score, a contradiction. To this end,
we will prove that m(W) ≤ s(k − 1); as |W | = k, our claim would then follow by the
pigeonhole principle.
Consider the set N \ N∗; we have n ≤ sk, so |N \ N∗| ≤ n − s ≤ s(k − 1). Pick
a voter i ∈ N \ N∗, and let j = |Ai ∩ W |. If j > 0, this voter contributes exactly 1j to
the marginal contribution of each candidate in Ai ∩ W, and hence her contribution to
m(W) is exactly 1. If j = 0, this voter does not contribute to m(W) at all. Therefore,
we have m(W) ≤ |N \ N∗| ≤ s(k − 1), which is what we wanted to prove. ⊓⊔
The reader may observe that the proof of Theorem 6 applies to all voting rules of
the form w-PAV where the weight vector satisfies w1 = 1, w j ≤ 1j for all j ≥ 1. In
Section 5 we will see that this condition on w is also necessary for w-PAV to satisfy
JR.
Next, we consider RAV . As this voting rule can be viewed as a tractable approx-
imation of PAV (recall that PAV is NP-hard to compute), one could expect that RAV
satisfies JR as well. However, this turns out not to be the case, at least if k is suffi-
ciently large.
Theorem 7 RAV satisfies JR for k = 2, but fails it for k ≥ 10.
Proof For k = 2, we can use essentially the same argument as for AV; however, we
do not need to assume anything about the tie-breaking rule. This is because if there
are three candidates, c, c′, and c′′, such that c and c′′ are approved by the same n2
voters, whereas c′ is approved by the remaining n2 voters, and RAV selects c in the
first round, then in the second round RAV favors c′ over c′′.
Now, suppose that k = 10. Consider a profile over a candidate set C = {c1, . . . , c11}
with 1199 voters who submit the following ballots:
81×{c1, c2}, 81×{c1, c3}, 80×{c2}, 80×{c3},
81×{c4, c5}, 81×{c4, c6}, 80×{c5}, 80×{c6},
49×{c7, c8}, 49×{c7, c9}, 49×{c7, c10},
96×{c8}, 96×{c9}, 96×{c10}, 120×{c11}.
Candidates c1 and c4 are each approved by 162 voters, the most of any candidate,
and these blocks of 162 voters do not overlap, so RAV selects c1 and c4 first. This
reduces the RAV scores of c2, c3, c5 and c6 from 80 + 81 = 161 to 80 + 40.5 = 120.5,
so c7, whose RAV score is 147, is selected next. Now, the RAV scores of c8, c9 and c10
become 96 + 24.5 = 120.5. The selection of any of c2, c3, c5, c6, c8, c9 or c10 does not
affect the RAV score of the others, so all seven of these candidates will be selected
before c11, who has 120 approvals. Thus, after the selection of 10 candidates, there
are 120 > 119910 =
n
k unrepresented voters who jointly approve c11.
To extend this construction to k > 10, we create k − 10 additional candidates and
120(k − 10) additional voters such that for each new candidate, there are 120 new
voters who approve that candidate only. Note that we still have 120 > nk . RAV will
proceed to select c1, . . . , c10, followed by k− 10 additional candidates, and c11 or one
of the new candidates will remain unselected. ⊓⊔
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While RAV itself does not satisfy JR, one could hope that this can be fixed by tweak-
ing the weights, i.e. that w-RAV satisfies JR for a suitable weight vector w. However,
it turns out that (1, 0, . . . ) is essentially the only weight vector for which this is the
case: Theorem 7 extends to w-RAV for every weight vector w with w1 = 1, w2 > 0.
Theorem 8 For every vector w = (w1,w2, . . . ) with w1 = 1, w2 > 0, there exists a
value of k0 > 0 such that w-RAV does not satisfy JR for k > k0.
Proof Pick a positive integer s ≥ 8 such that w2 ≥ 1s . Let C = C1 ∪C2 ∪ {x, y}, where
C1 = {ci, j | i = 1, . . . , 2s + 3, j = 1, . . . , 2s + 1}, C2 = {ci | i = 1, . . . , 2s + 3}.
For each i = 1, . . . , 2s+ 3 and each j = 1, . . . , 2s+ 1 we construct 2s3 − s voters who
approve ci, j only and s2 voters who approve ci, j and ci only. Finally, we construct
2s3 − 1 voters who approve x only and s2 − 7s − 5 voters who approve y only (note
that the number of voters who approve y is positive by our choice of s).
Set k0 = (2s+ 2)(2s+ 3) = |C1 ∪C2|. Note that the number of voters n is given by
(2s + 3)(2s + 1)(2s3 + s2 − s) + (2s3 − 1) + (s2 − 7s − 5)
= (2s + 2)(2s + 3)(2s3 − 1) = (2s3 − 1)k0,
and hence nk0 = 2s
3 − 1.
Under w-RAV initially the score of each candidate in C2 is s2(2s + 1) = 2s3 + s2,
the score of each candidate in C1 is 2s3+ s2− s, the score of x is 2s3−1, and the score
of y is s2−7s−5, so in the first 2s+3 rounds the candidates from C2 get elected. After
that, the score of every candidate in C1 becomes 2s3 − s + w2 s2 ≥ 2s3 − s + s = 2s3,
while the scores of x and y remains unchanged. Therefore, in the next (2s+3)(2s+1)
rounds the candidates from C1 get elected. At this point, k candidates are elected, and
x is not elected, even though the 2s3 − 1 = nk0 voters who approve him do not approve
of any of the candidates in the winning set.
To extend this argument to larger values of k, we proceed as in the proof of The-
orem 7: for k > k0, we add k − k0 new candidates, and for each new candidate we
construct 2s3 − 1 new voters who approve that candidate only. Let the resulting num-
ber of voters be n′; we have n′k = 2s
3 − 1, so w-RAV will first select the candidates in
C2, followed by the candidates in C1, and then it will choose k−k0 winners among the
new candidates and x. As a result, either x or one of the new candidates will remain
unselected. ⊓⊔
Remark 1 Theorem 8 partially subsumes Theorem 7: it implies that RAV fails JR, but
the proof only shows that this is the case for k ≥ 18·19 = 342, while Theorem 7 states
that RAV fails JR for k ≥ 10 already. We chose to include the proof of Theorem 7
because we feel that it is useful to know what happens for relatively small values of
k. Note, however, that Theorem 7 leaves open the question of whether RAV satisfies
JR for k = 3, . . . , 9. Very recently, Sanche´z-Fernande´z et al. (2016) have answered
this question by showing that RAV satisfies JR for k ≤ 5 and fails it for k ≥ 6.
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If we allow the entries of the weight vector to depend on the number of voters n, we
can obtain another class of rules that provide justified representation: the argument
used to show that GAV satisfies JR extends to w-RAV where the weight vector w
satisfies w1 = 1, w j ≤ 1n for j > 1. In particular, the rule (1, 1n , 1n2 , . . . , )-RAV is
somewhat more appealing than GAV: for instance, if
⋂
i∈N Ai = {c} and k > 1, GAV
will pick c, and then behave arbitrarily, whereas (1, 1
n
, 1
n2
, . . . , )-RAV will also pick
c, but then it will continue to look for candidates approved by as many voters as
possible.
We conclude this section by showing that MonAV satisfies JR.
Theorem 9 MonAV satisfies JR.
Proof Fix a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) and a k > 0. Let W be an output of
MonAV on (A, k). If Ai ∩W , ∅ for all i ∈ N, then W provides justified representation
for (A, k). Thus, assume that this is not the case, i.e. there exists some voter i with
Ai ∩ W = ∅. Consider a valid mapping π : N → W whose Monroe score equals the
Monroe score of W, let c = π(i), and set s = |π−1(c)|; note that s ∈ {⌊ nk ⌋, ⌈ nk ⌉}.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that W does not provide justified represen-
tation for (A, k). Then by our choice of s there exists a set N∗ ⊂ N, |N∗| = s, such
that
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai , ∅, but W ∩ (
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai) = ∅. Let c′ be some candidate approved by all
voters in N∗, and set W′ = (W \ {c}) ∪ {c′}. To obtain a contradiction, we will argue
that W′ has a higher Monroe score than W.
To this end, we will modify π by first swapping the voters in N∗ with voters
in π−1(c) and then assigning the voters in N∗ to c′. Formally, let σ : π−1(c) \ N∗ →
N∗ \π−1(c) be a bijection between π−1(c)\N∗ and N∗ \π−1(c). We construct a mapping
πˆ : N → W′ by setting
πˆ(i) =

π(σ(i)) for i ∈ π−1(c) \ N∗,
c′ for i ∈ N∗,
π(i) for i < π−1(c) ∪ N∗.
Note that πˆ is a valid mapping: we have |πˆ−1(c′)| = s and |πˆ−1(c′′)| = |π−1(c′′)| for
each c′′ ∈ W′ \ {c′}. Now, let us consider the impact of this modification on the
Monroe score. The s voters in N∗ contributed nothing to the Monroe score of π,
and they contribute s to the Monroe score of πˆ. By our choice of c, the voters in
π−1(c) contributed at most s − 1 to the Monroe score of π, and their contribution to
the Monroe score of πˆ is non-negative. For all other voters their contribution to the
Monroe score of π is equal to their contribution to the Monroe score of π′. Thus, the
total Monroe score of πˆ is higher than that of π. Since the Monroe score of W is equal
to the Monroe score of π, and, by definition, the Monroe score of W′ is at least the
Monroe score of πˆ, we obtain a contradiction. ⊓⊔
5 Extended Justified Representation
We have identified four (families of) voting rules that satisfy JR for arbitrary ballot
profiles: w-PAV with w1 = 1, w j ≤ 1j for j > 1 (this class includes PAV), w-RAV
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with w1 = 1, w j ≤ 1n for j > 1 (this class includes GAV), GAVT and MonAV . The
obvious advantage of GAV and GAVT is that their output can be computed efficiently,
whereas computing the outputs of PAV or MonAV is NP-hard. However, GAV puts
considerable emphasis on representing every voter, at the expense of ensuring that
large sets of voters with shared preferences are allocated an adequate number of rep-
resentatives. This approach may be problematic in a variety of applications, such as
selecting a representative assembly, or choosing movies to be shown on an airplane,
or foods to be provided at a banquet (see the discussion by Skowron et al. 2015a).
In particular, it may be desirable to have several assembly members that represent a
widely held political position, both to reflect the popularity of this position, and to
highlight specific aspects of it, as articulated by different candidates. Consider, for
instance, the following example.
Example 2 Let k = 3, C = {a, b, c, d}, and n = 100. One voter approves c, one voter
approves d, and 98 voters approve a and b. GAV would include both c and d in the
winning set, whereas in many settings it would be more reasonable to choose both a
and b (and one of c and d); indeed, this is exactly what GAVT would do.
This issue is not addressed by the JR axiom, as this axiom does not care if a given
voter is represented by one or more candidates. Thus, if we want to capture the intu-
ition that large cohesive groups of voters should be allocated several representatives,
we need a stronger condition. Recall that JR says that each group of nk voters that all
approve the same candidate “deserves” at least one representative. It seems reason-
able to scale this idea and say that, for every ℓ > 0, each group of ℓ · nk voters that
all approve the same ℓ candidates “deserves” at least ℓ representatives. This approach
can be formalized as follows.
Definition 2 (Extended justified representation (EJR)) Given a ballot profile
(A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C, a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|, and a posi-
tive integer ℓ, ℓ ≤ k, we say that a set of candidates W, |W | = k, provides ℓ-justified
representation for (A, k) if there does not exist a set of voters N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| ≥ ℓ · nk
such that |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ, but |Ai ∩ W | < ℓ for each i ∈ N∗; we say that W provides
extended justified representation (EJR) for (A, k) if it provides ℓ-JR for (A, k) for all
ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k. We say that an approval-based voting rule satisfies ℓ-justified represen-
tation (ℓ-JR) if for every profile A = (A1, . . . , An) and every target committee size k it
outputs a committee that provides ℓ-JR for (A, k). Finally, we say that a rule satisfies
extended justified representation (EJR) if it satisfies ℓ-JR for all ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k.
Observe that EJR implies JR, because the latter coincides with 1-JR.
The definition of EJR interprets “a group N∗ deserves at least ℓ representatives”
as “at least one voter in N∗ gets ℓ representatives”. Of course, other interpretations
are also possible: for instance, we can require that each voter in N∗ is represented by
ℓ candidates in the winning committee or, alternatively, that the winning committee
contains at least ℓ candidates each of which is approved by some member of N∗.
However, the former requirement is too strong: it differs from JR for ℓ = 1 and
in Section 6 we show that there are ballot profiles for which commitees with this
property do not exist even for ℓ = 1. The latter approach, which was very recently
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proposed by Sanche´z-Fernande´z et al. (2016) (see the discussion in Section 7), is not
unreasonable; in particular, it coincides with JR for ℓ = 1. However, it is strictly
less demanding than the approach we take: clearly, every rule that satisfies EJR also
satisfies this condition. As it turns out (Theorem 10) that every ballot profile admits a
committee that provides EJR, the EJR axiom offers more guidance in choosing a good
winning committee than its weaker cousin, while still leaving us with a non-empty set
of candidate committees to choose from. Finally, the EJR axiom in its present form is
very similar to a core stability condition for a natural NTU game associated with the
input profile (see Section 5.2); it is not clear if the axiom of Sanche´z-Fernande´z et al.
(2016) admits a similar interpretation.
5.1 Extended Justified Representation under Approval-Based Rules
It is natural to ask which of the voting rules that satisfy JR also satisfy EJR. Example 2
immediately shows that for GAV the answer is negative. Consequently, no w-RAV rule
such that the entries of w do not depend on n satisfies EJR: if w2 = 0, this rule is GAV
and if w2 > 0, our claim follows from Theorem 8. Moreover, Example 2 also implies
that w-RAV rules with w j ≤ 1n for j > 1 also fail EJR.
The next example shows that MAV fails EJR even if each voter approves exactly
k candidates (recall that under this assumption MAV satisfies JR).
Example 3 Let k = 4, C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 ∪ C4, where |C1| = |C2| = |C3| = |C4| = 4
and the sets C1,C2,C3,C4 are pairwise disjoint. Let A = (A1, . . . , A8), where Ai = Ci
for i = 1, 2, 3, and Ai = C4 for i = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. MAV will select exactly one candidate
from each of the sets C1,C2,C3 and C4, but EJR dictates that at least two candidates
from C4 are chosen.
Further, MonAV fails EJR as well.
Example 4 Let k = 4, C = {c1, c2, c3, c4, a, b}, N = {1, . . . , 8}, Ai = {ci} for
i = 1, . . . , 4, Ai = {ci−4, a, b} for i = 5, . . . , 8. MonAV outputs {c1, c2, c3, c4} on this
profile, as this is the unique set of candidates with the maximum Monroe score. Thus,
every voter is represented by a single candidate, though the voters in N∗ = {5, 6, 7, 8}
“deserve” two candidates.
Example 4 illustrates the conflict between the EJR axiom and the requirement to rep-
resent all voters whenever possible. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 7.
For GAVT , it is not hard to construct an example where this rule fails EJR for
some way of breaking intermediate ties.
Example 5 Let N = {1, . . . , 8}, C = {a, b, c, d, e, f }, A1 = A2 = {a}, A3 = A4 =
{a, b, c}, A5 = A6 = {d, b, c}, A7 = {d, e}, A8 = {d, f }. Suppose that k = 4. Note that
all voters in N∗ = {3, 4, 5, 6} approve b and c, and |N∗| = 2 · nk . Under GAV
T
, at the
first step candidates a, b, c and d are tied, so we can select a and remove voters 3 and
4. Next, we have to select d; we can then remove voters 5 and 6. In the remaining
two steps, we add e and f to the committee. The resulting committee violates EJR,
as each voter in N∗ = {3, 4, 5, 6} is only represented by a single candidate.
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We note that in Example 5 we can remove voters 1 and 2 after selecting a, which
enables us to select b or c in the second step and thereby obtain a committee that
provides EJR. In fact, we were unable to construct an example where GAVT fails
EJR for all ways of breaking intermediate ties; we now conjecture that it is always
possible to break intermediate ties in GAVT so as to satisfy EJR. However, it is not
clear if a tie-breaking rule with this property can be formulated in a succinct manner.
Thus, GAVT does not seem particularly useful if we want to find a committee that
provides EJR: even if our conjecture is true, we may have to explore all ways of
breaking intermediate ties.
In contrast, we will now show that PAV satisfies EJR irrespective of the tie-
breaking rule.
Theorem 10 PAV satisfies EJR.
Proof Suppose that PAV violates EJR for some value of k, and consider a ballot
profile A1, . . . , An, a value of ℓ > 0 and a set of voters N∗, |N∗| = s ≥ ℓ · nk , that
witness this. Let W, |W | = k, be the winning set. We know that at least one of the ℓ
candidates approved by all voters in N∗ is not elected; let c be some such candidate.
Each voter in N∗ has at most ℓ − 1 representatives in W, so the marginal contribution
of c (if it were to be added to W) would be at least s · 1
ℓ
≥ nk . On the other hand, the
argument in the proof of Theorem 6 can be modified to show that the sum of marginal
contributions of candidates in W is at most n.
Now, consider some candidate w ∈ W with the smallest marginal contribution;
clearly, his marginal contribution is at most nk . If it is strictly less than
n
k , we are
done, as we can improve the total PAV-score by swapping w and c, a contradiction.
Therefore suppose it is exactly nk , and therefore the marginal contribution of each
candidate in W is exactly nk . Since PAV satisfies JR, we know that Ai ∩ W , ∅ for
some i ∈ N∗. Pick some candidate w′ ∈ W ∩ Ai, and set W′ = (W \ {w′}) ∪ {c}.
Observe that after w′ is removed, adding c increases the total PAV-score by at least
(s − 1) · 1
ℓ
+ 1
ℓ−1 >
n
k . Indeed, i approves at most ℓ − 2 candidates in W \ {w
′} and
therefore adding c to W \ {w′} contributes at least 1
ℓ−1 to her satisfaction. Thus, the
PAV-score of W′ is higher than that of W, a contradiction again. ⊓⊔
Interestingly, Theorem 10 does not extend to weight vectors other than
(1, 12 , 13 , . . . ): our next theorem shows that PAV is essentially the unique w-PAV rule
that satisfies EJR.
Theorem 11 For every weight vector w with w1 = 1, w , (1, 12 , 13 , . . . ), the rule
w-PAV does not satisfy EJR.
Theorem 11 follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2, which are stated below.
Lemma 1 Consider a weight vector w with w1 = 1. If w j > 1j for some j > 1, then
w-PAV fails JR.
Proof Suppose that w j = 1j + ε for some j > 1 and ε > 0. Pick k > ⌈ 1ε j ⌉ + 1 so that j
divides k; let t = kj . Let C = C0 ∪C1 ∪ · · · ∪Ct, where C0 = {c}, |C1| = · · · = |Ct| = j,
and the sets C0,C1, . . . ,Ct are pairwise disjoint. Note that |C| = t j + 1 = k + 1. Also,
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construct t+1 pairwise disjoint groups of voters N0, N1, . . . , Nt so that |N0| = k, |N1| =
· · · = |Nt| = j(k−1), and for each i = 0, 1, . . . , t the voters in Ni approve the candidates
in Ci only. Observe that the total number of voters is given by n = k + t j(k − 1) = k2.
We have |N0| = k = nk , so every committee that provides justified representation
for this profile must elect c. However, we claim that w-PAV elects all candidates in
C \ {c} instead. Indeed, if we replace an arbitrary candidate in C \ {c} with c, then
under w-PAV the total score of our committee changes by
k − j(k − 1) ·
(
1
j + ε
)
= 1 − j(k − 1)ε < 1 − jε
⌈
1
ε j
⌉
≤ 0,
i.e. C \ {c} has a strictly higher score than any committee that includes c. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2 Consider a weight vector w with w1 = 1. If w j < 1j for some j > 1, then
w-PAV fails j-JR.
Proof Suppose that w j = 1j − ε for some j > 1 and ε > 0. Pick k > j + ⌈ 1ε ⌉. Let C =
C0 ∪C1, where |C0| = j, C1 = {c1, . . . , ck− j+1} and C0 ∩C1 = ∅. Note that |C| = k + 1.
Also, construct k − j + 2 pairwise disjoint groups of voters N0, N1, . . . , Nk− j+1 so that
|N0| = j(k− j+1), |N1| = · · · = |Nk− j+1| = k− j, the voters in N0 approve the candidates
in C0 only, and for each i = 1, . . . , k− j+ 1 the voters in Ni approve ci only. Note that
the number of voters is given by n = j(k − j + 1) + (k − j + 1)(k − j) = k(k − j + 1).
We have nk = k− j+1 and |N0| = j · nk , so every committee that provides EJR must
select all candidates in C0. However, we claim that w-PAV elects all candidates from
C1 and j − 1 candidates from C0 instead. Indeed, let c be some candidate in C0, let c′
be some candidate in C1, and let W = C \ {c}, W′ = C \ {c′}. The difference between
the total score of W and that of W′ is
j(k − j + 1)
(
1
j − ε
)
− (k − j) < 1 − j · 1
ε
· ε < 1 − j < 0,
i.e. w-PAV assigns a higher score to W. As this argument does not depend on the
choice of c in C0 and c′ in C1, the proof is complete. ⊓⊔
5.2 JR, EJR and Core Stability
One can view (extended) justified representation as a stability condition, by associat-
ing committees that provide JR/EJR with outcomes of a certain NTU game that are
resistant to certain types of deviations.
Specifically, given a pair (A, k), where A = (A1, . . . , An), we define an NTU game
G(A, k) with the set of players N as follows. We assume that each coalition of size x,
ℓ nk ≤ x < (ℓ+1) nk , where ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, can “purchase” ℓ alternatives. Moreover, each
player evaluates a committee of size ℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, using the PAV utility function,
i.e. i derives a utility of 1 + 12 + · · · +
1
j from a committee that contains exactly j of
her approved alternatives (the argument goes through for w-PAV utilities, as long as
w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wk > 0). Thus, for each coalition S with ℓ nk ≤ |S | < (ℓ + 1) nk a payoff
vector x ∈ Rn is considered to be feasible for S if and only if there exists a committee
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W ⊆ A with |W | ≤ ℓ such that xi = ui(W) for each i ∈ S , where ui(W) = 1+· · ·+ 1|Ai∩W | .
We denote the set of all payoff vectors that are feasible for a coalition S ⊆ N by V(S ).
We say that a coalition S ⊆ N has a profitable deviation from a payoff vector
x ∈ V(N) if there exists a payoff vector y ∈ V(S ) such that yi > xi for all i ∈ S . A
payoff vector x is stable if it is feasible for N and no coalition S ⊆ N has a profitable
deviation from it; the set of all stable payoff vectors is the core of G(A, k).
The following theorem describes the relationship between JR, EJR, and outcomes
of G(A, k).
Theorem 12 A committee W, |W | = k, provides justified representation for (A, k) if
and only if no coalition of size ⌈ nk ⌉ or less has a profitable deviation from the payoff
vector x associated with W. Moreover, W provides extended justified representation
for (A, k) if and only if for every ℓ ≥ 0 no coalition N∗ with ℓ · nk ≤ |N∗| < (ℓ + 1) · nk ,
| ∩i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ has a profitable deviation from x.
Proof Suppose that W fails to provide justified representation for (A, k), i.e. there
exists a set of voters N∗, |N∗| = ⌈ nk ⌉, who all approve some candidate c < W, but none
of them approves any of the candidates in W. Then we have xi = 0 for each i ∈ N∗,
and players in N∗ can successfully deviate: the payoff vector y that is associated with
the committee {c} is feasible for N∗ and satisfies yi = 1 for each i ∈ N∗.
Conversely, suppose that W provides justified representation for (A, k), and con-
sider a coalition N∗. If |N∗| < ⌈ nk ⌉, then for every y ∈ V(N∗) we have yi = 0 for all
i ∈ N∗, so N∗ cannot profitably deviate. On the other hand, if |N∗| = ⌈ nk ⌉, then every
payoff vector y ∈ V(N∗) is associated with a committee of size 1. Hence, for every
y ∈ V(N∗) we have yi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N∗, and if yi = 1 for all i ∈ N∗, then ∩i∈N∗ Ai , ∅,
and therefore, since W provides JR, we have xi ≥ 1 for some i ∈ N∗.
For EJR the argument is similar. If W fails to provide extended justified represen-
tation for (A, k), there exists an ℓ > 0 and a set of voters N∗, |N∗| ≥ ℓ · nk , such that
|
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ, but |Ai∩W | < ℓ for each i ∈ N∗. Then we have xi < 1+ · · ·+ 1ℓ for each
i ∈ N∗, and players in N∗ can successfully deviate: if S is a committee that consists
of some ℓ candidates in ⋂i∈N∗ Ai, then the payoff vector y that is associated with S is
feasible for N∗ and satisfies yi = 1 + · · · + 1ℓ for each i ∈ N
∗
.
Conversely, suppose that W provides extended justified representation for (A, k),
and consider some ℓ ≥ 0 and some coalition N∗ with ℓ · nk ≤ |N
∗| < (ℓ+ 1) nk . We have
argued above that if ℓ = 0, then N∗ cannot profitably deviate. Thus, assume ℓ > 0.
Every payoff vector y ∈ V(N∗) is associated with a committee of size ℓ. Hence, for
every y ∈ V(N∗) we have yi ≤ 1 + · · · + 1ℓ for all i ∈ S , and if yi = 1 + · · · + 1ℓ for all
i ∈ N∗, then | ∩i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ. Since W provides EJR, we have xi ≥ 1 + · · · + 1ℓ for some
i ∈ N∗. ⊓⊔
The second part of Theorem 12 considers deviations by cohesive coalitions.
The reader may wonder if it can be strengthened to arbitrary coalitional deviations,
i.e. whether a committee provides EJR if and only if the associated payoff vector is in
the core of G(A, k). The following example shows that this is not the case.
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Example 6 Let k = 10, C = {x1, x2, . . . , x10, y, z}, N = {1, 2, . . . , 20}, and
A1 = A2 = A3 = {x1, y},
A4 = A5 = A6 = {x1, z},
A7 = . . . = A20 = {x2, . . . , x10}.
Then PAV outputs the committee W = {x1, x2, . . . , x10} for (A, k); in particular, W
provides EJR for (A, k). However, the associated payoff vector x is not in the core, as
the players in {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, a coalition of size 3 nk , can successfully deviate: the pay-
off vector associated with {x1, y, z} is feasible for {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and provides a higher
payoff than x to each of the first six players. We remark that the core of G(A, k) is not
empty: in particular, it contains the payoff vector associated with {x1, . . . , x8, y, z}.
It remains an open question whether the core of G(A, k) is non-empty for every
pair (A, k). Further, while it would be desirable to have a voting rule that outputs a
committee whose associated payoff vector is in the core whenever the core is not
empty, we are not aware of any such rule: every voting rule that fails EJR also fails
this more demanding criterion, and Example 6 illustrates that PAV fails this criterion
as well.
5.3 Computational Issues
In Section 3 we have argued that it is easy to find a committee that provides JR for a
given ballot profile, and to check whether a specific committee provides JR. In con-
trast, for EJR these questions appear to be computationally difficult. Specifically, we
were unable to design an efficient algorithm for computing a committee that provides
EJR; while PAV is guaranteed to find such a committee, computing its output is NP-
hard. We remark, however, that when ℓ is bounded by a constant, we can efficiently
compute a committee that provides ℓ-JR, i.e. the challenge is in handling large values
of ℓ.
Theorem 13 A committee satisfying ℓ-JR can be computed in time polynomial in n
and |C|ℓ.
Proof Consider the following greedy algorithm, which we will refer to as ℓ-GAV . We
start by setting C′ = C, A′ = A, and W = ∅. As long as |W | ≤ k − ℓ, we check if
there exists a set of candidates {c1, . . . , cℓ} ⊂ C′ that is unanimously approved by at
least ℓ nk voters in A
′ (this can be done in time n · |C|ℓ+1). If such a set exists, we set
W := W ∪ {c1, . . . , cℓ} and we remove from A′ all ballots Ai such that |Ai ∩ W | ≥ ℓ
(note that this includes all ballots Ai with {c1, . . . cℓ} ⊆ Ai). If at some point we have
|W | ≤ k − ℓ and there is no {c1, . . . , cℓ} that satisfy our criterion or |W | > k− ℓ, we add
an arbitrary k − |W | candidates from C′ to W and return W; if this does not happen,
we terminate after having picked k candidates.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that for some profile A = (A1, . . . , An)
and some k > 0, ℓ-GAV outputs a committee that does not provide ℓ-JR for (A, k).
Then there exists a set N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| ≥ ℓ nk such that |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ and, when
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ℓ-GAV terminates, every ballot Ai such that i ∈ N∗ is still in A′. Consider some
subset of candidates {c1, . . . , cℓ} ⊆
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai. At every point in the execution of ℓ-GAV
this subset is unanimously approved by at least |N∗| ≥ ℓ nk ballots in A
′
. As at least
one of {c1, . . . , cℓ} was not elected, at every stage the algorithm selected a set of ℓ
candidates that was approved by at least ℓ nk ballots (until more than k − ℓ candidates
were selected). Since at the end of each stage the algorithm removed from A′ all
ballots containing the candidates that had been added to W at that stage, it follows
that altogether the algorithm has removed at least ⌊ k
ℓ
⌋ · ℓ nk > ( kℓ − 1) · ℓ nk = n − ℓ nk
ballots from A′. This is a contradiction, since we assumed that, when the algorithm
terminates, the ℓ nk ballots (Ai)i∈N∗ are still in A′.
For the problem of checking whether a given committee provides EJR for a given
input, we can establish a formal hardness result.
Theorem 14 Given a ballot profile A, a target committee size k, and a committee W,
|W | = k, it is coNP-complete to check whether W provides EJR for (A, k).
Proof It is easy to see that this problem is in coNP: to show that W does not provide
EJR for (A, k), it suffices to guess an integer ℓ and a set of voters N∗ of size at least
ℓ · nk such that |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ, but |Ai ∩ W | < ℓ for all i ∈ N∗.
To prove coNP-completeness, we reduce the classic Balanced Biclique problem
(Garey and Johnson 1979, [GT24]) to the complement of our problem. An instance
of Balanced Biclique is given by a bipartite graph (L,R, E) with parts L and R and
edge set E, and an integer ℓ; it is a “yes”-instance if we can pick subsets of vertices
L′ ⊆ L and R′ ⊆ R so that |L′| = |R′| = ℓ and (u, v) ∈ E for each u ∈ L′, v ∈ R′;
otherwise, it is a “no”-instance.
Given an instance 〈(L,R, E), ℓ〉 of Balanced Biclique with R = {v1, . . . , vs}, we
create an instance of our problem as follows. Assume without loss of generality that
s ≥ 3, ℓ ≥ 3. We construct 4 pairwise disjoint sets of candidates C0, C1, C′1, C2, so
that C0 = L, |C1| = |C′1| = ℓ − 1, |C2| = sℓ + ℓ − 3s, and set C = C0 ∪ C1 ∪ C
′
1 ∪ C2.
We then construct 3 sets of voters N0, N1, N2, so that N0 = {1, . . . , s}, |N1| = ℓ(s − 1),
|N2| = sℓ+ ℓ− 3s (note that |N2| > 0 as we assume that ℓ ≥ 3). For each i ∈ N0 we set
Ai = {u j | (u j, vi) ∈ E} ∪C1, and for each i ∈ N1 we set Ai = C0 ∪C′1. The candidates
in C2 are matched to voters in N2: each voter in N2 approves exactly one candidate
in C2, and each candidate in C2 is approved by exactly one voter in N2. Denote the
resulting list of ballots by A. Finally, we set k = 2ℓ − 2, and let W = C1 ∪ C′1. Note
that the number of voters n is given by s+ ℓ(s− 1)+ sℓ+ ℓ− 3s = 2s(ℓ− 1), so nk = s.
Suppose first that we started with a “yes”-instance of Balanced Biclique, and
let (L′,R′) be the respective ℓ-by-ℓ biclique. Let C∗ = L′, N∗ = N0 ∪ N1. Then
|N∗| = ℓs, all voters in N∗ approve all candidates in C∗, |C∗| = ℓ, but each voter in
N∗ is only represented by ℓ− 1 candidates in W. Hence, W fails to provide ℓ-justified
representation for (A, k).
Conversely, suppose that W fails to provide EJR for (A, k). That is, there exists a
value j > 0, a set N∗ of js voters and a set C∗ of j candidates so that all voters in N∗
approve of all candidates in C∗, but for each voter in N∗ at most j of her approved
candidates are in W. Note that, since s > 1, we have N∗ ∩ N2 = ∅. Further, each voter
in N \ N2 is represented by ℓ − 1 candidates in W, so j ≥ ℓ. As N∗ = js ≥ ℓs ≥ s, it
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follows that |N∗ ∩ N0| ≥ ℓ, |N∗ ∩ N1| > 0. Since N∗ contains voters from both N0 and
N1, it follows that C∗ ⊆ C0. Thus, there are at least ℓ voters in N∗ ∩ N0 who approve
the same j ≥ ℓ candidates in C0; any set of ℓ such voters and ℓ such candidates
corresponds to an ℓ-by-ℓ biclique in the input graph. ⊓⊔
6 Variants of Justified Representation
The definition of JR requires that if there is a group of ⌈ nk ⌉ voters who jointly approve
some candidate, then the elected committee has to contain at least one candidate ap-
proved by some member of this group. This condition may appear to be too weak;
it may seem more natural to require that every group member approves some can-
didate in the committee, or—stronger yet—that the committee contains at least one
candidate approved by all group members. This intuition is captured by the following
definitions.
Definition 3 Given a ballot profile (A1, . . . , An) and a target committee size k, we say
that a committee W of size k provides
– semi-strong justified representation for (A, k) if for each group N∗ ⊆ N with
|N∗| ≥ nk and
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai , ∅ it holds that W ∩ Ai , ∅ for all i ∈ N∗.
– strong justified representation for (A, k) if for each group N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| ≥ nk
and ⋂i∈N∗ Ai , ∅ it holds that W ∩ (∩i∈N∗ Ai) , ∅.
By definition, a committee providing strong justified representation also provides
semi-strong justified representation, and a committee providing semi-strong justified
representation also provides (standard) justified representation.
However, it turns out that satisfying these stronger requirements is not always fea-
sible: there are ballot profiles for which no committee provides semi-strong justified
representation.
Example 7 Let k = 3 and consider the following profile with n = 9 and C =
{a, b, c, d}.
A1 = A2 = {a} A3 = {a, b} A4 = {b} A5 = {b, c}
A6 = {c} A7 = {c, d} A8 = A9 = {d}
For each candidate x ∈ C, there are nk = 3 voters such that ∩iAi = {x}, and at least
one of those voters has Ai = {x}. Thus, a committee that satisfies semi-strong justified
representation would have to contain all four candidates, which is impossible.
While Example 7 shows that no approval-based voting rule can always find a commit-
tee that provides strong or semi-strong justified representation, it may be interesting
to identify voting rules that output such committees whenever they exist.
Finally, we remark that strong justified representation does not imply EJR.
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Example 8 Let C = {a, b, c, d, e}, n = 4, k = 4, and consider the following ballot
profile.
A1 : {a, b} A2 : {a, b} A3 : {c} A4 : {d, e}
EJR requires that we choose both a and b, but {a, c, d, e} provides strong justified
representation.
7 Related Work
It is instructive to compare JR and EJR to alternative approaches towards fair repre-
sentation, such as representativeness (Duddy 2014) and proportional justified repre-
sentation (Sanche´z-Fernande´z et al. 2016).
Duddy (2014) proposes the notion of representativeness, which applies to prob-
abilistic voting rules. The property Duddy proposes is incomparable with JR: in sit-
uations he considers (k = 2, n voters approve x, n + 1 voters approve y and z), JR
requires that one of y and z should be selected, whereas Duddy requires x to be se-
lected with positive probability. Both are reasonable requirements, but they address
different concerns. Duddy’s axiom say nothing about situations where voters are split
equally (say, n voters approve {x, y}, n voters approve {z, t}), whereas JR requires that
each voter is represented. Another obvious difference is that he allows for randomized
rules.
Very recently (after the conference version of our paper was published),
Sanche´z-Fernande´z et al. (2016) came up with the notion of proportional justified
representation (PJR), which can be seen as an alternative to EJR. A committee is
said to provide PJR for a ballot profile (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C and a tar-
get committee size k if, for every positive integer ℓ, ℓ ≤ k, there does not exist a set of
voters N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| ≥ ℓ · nk such that |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ, but |(
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai) ∩ W | < ℓ. In
contrast to EJR, the PJR condition does not require one of the voters in N∗ to have ℓ
representatives. Rather, a committee provides PJR as long as it contains ℓ candidates
that are approved by (possibly different) voters in N∗, for every group N∗ satisfying
the size and cohesiveness constraints. An attractive feature of PJR is that it is compat-
ible with the idea of perfect representation: a committee W provides perfect represen-
tation for a group of n voters and a target committee size k if n = ks for some positive
integer s and the voters can be split into k pairwise disjoint groups N1, . . . , Nk of size
s each in such a way that there is a one-to-one mapping µ : W → {N1, . . . , Nk} such
that for each candidate a ∈ W all voters in µ(a) approve a. Sanche´z-Fernande´z et al.
(2016) prove that every committee that provides perfect representation also provides
PJR; in contrast, EJR may rule out all committees that provide perfect representation,
as illustrated by Example 4. It is easily seen that PJR is a weaker requirement than
EJR, and a stronger one than JR. Interestingly, Sanche´z-Fernande´z et al. (2016) show
that many results that we have established for EJR also hold for PJR: in particular,
w-RAV violates PJR for every weight vector w, and w-PAV satisfies PJR if and only
if w = (1, 12 , 13 , . . . ).
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8 Conclusions
JR EJR Complexity
Rule
AV – – in P
SAV – – in P
MAV – – NP-hard
RAV – – in P
GAV X – in P
GAVT X –∗ in P
MonAV X – NP-hard
PAV X X NP-hard
Table 1 Satisfaction of JR and EJR and complexity of approval-based voting rules; the superscript ‘∗’
indicates that the rule fails the respective axiom for some way of breaking intermediate ties.
We have formulated a desirable property of approval-based committee selection rules,
which we called justified representation (JR). While JR is fairly easy to satisfy, it
turns out that many well-known approval-based rules fail it. A prominent exception
is the PAV rule, which also satisfies a stronger version of this property, namely ex-
tended justified representation (EJR). Indeed, EJR characterizes PAV within the class
of w-PAV rules, and we are not aware of any other natural voting rule that satisfies
EJR irrespective of the tie-breaking rule (of course, we can construct voting rules
that differ from PAV, yet satisfy EJR, by modifying the output of PAV on profiles
on which EJR places no constraints on the output). Perhaps the most pressing open
question suggested by our work is whether there is an efficient algorithm for finding
a committee that provides EJR for a given profile. In particular, we would like to un-
derstand whether we can break ties in the execution of GAVT to always produce such
a committee, and whether some tie-breaking rule with this property is polynomial-
time computable. Also, it would be interesting to see if EJR, in combination with
other natural axioms, can be used to axiomatize PAV . Concerning (semi-)strong jus-
tified representation, an interesting algorithmic problem is whether there are efficient
algorithm for checking the existence of committees satisfying these requirements.
Justified representation can also be used to formulate new approval-based rules.
We mention two rules that seem particularly attractive:
The utilitarian (E)JR rule returns a committee that, among all committees
that satisfy (E)JR, has the highest AV score.
The egalitarian (E)JR rule returns a committee that, among all committees
that satisfy (E)JR, maximizes the number of representatives of the voter who
has the least number of representatives in the winning committee.
The computational complexity of winner determination for these rules is an interest-
ing problem.
Since PAV is NP-hard to compute, our study also provides additional motiva-
tion for the use of approximation and parameterized algorithms to compute PAV out-
comes. Finally, analyzing the compatibility of JR with other important properties,
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such as, e.g., strategyproofness for dichotomous preferences, is another avenue of
future research.
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